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Symposium on Reform of the
Exclusionary Rule
An Invitation to Dialogue: Exploring the

Pepperdine Proposal to Move Beyond the
Exclusionary Rule
L. Timothy Perrin*
H. Mitchell CaldwellCarol A. Chase***
Ifa single principlemay be drawnfrom this Court'sexclusionaryrule decisions,from
Weeks through Mapp v. Ohio, to the decisions handeddown today, it is thatthe scope
ofthe exclusionaryrule is subject to change in light of changingjudicial understanding about the effects of the rule outside the confines of the courtroom.
Justice Harry Blacklnun'
I conclude, therefore, that an entirely different remedy is necessary.... Congress
should develop an administrativeor quasi-judicialremedy against the government
itself to afford compensation and restitutionfor persons whose Fourth Amendment
rights have been violated ...
Such a statutory scheme would have the added
advantage of providing some remedy to the completely innocent persons who are
sometimes the victims of illegal police conduct-something that the suppression
doctrine, of course, can never accomplish.
2
Justice Warren Burger

Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.
Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.
** Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.
The authors are grateful to PepperdineLaw Review for supporting and sponsoring this symposium,
and in particular to Paul Rose, the former Editor-in-Chief, Linda Stevenson, the current Editor-in-Chief
and Chris Johnston and Lisa Herrera, Lead Articles Editors. In addition, we are grateful to Pejman
Yousefzadeh, who served as a liaison to the Law Review for the symposium, for his outstanding
assistance in the planning and development of the symposium.
1. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
2. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422 (1971) (Berger, J., dissenting).
*

**
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I. INTRODUCTION
The exclusionary rule is not inviolate. As the late Justice Blackmun suggested,
if judicial understanding about the effects of the rule leads to the conclusions that it

does not achieve the important goals that were its genesis and that it exacts an
unacceptably high price from our criminal justice system, the challenge for courts
and legislators is to find a better way.'
4
Our 1998 article, If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the ExclusionaryRule,

(the Pepperdine Study), describes our extensive empirical study of the exclusionary
rule and proposes a civil administrative remedy to partially replace the rule. In this
symposium we have invited judges, practitioners, and academics to critique our study
and our proposal with the goal of elevating the dialogue about the continuing efficacy
of the exclusionary rule. First, however, we briefly review our empirical study of the
rule and our proposed civil administrative remedy. Then, we present the thoughtful
critiques and counter-proposals from our symposium participants. Finally, we
respond to the critiques and argue in support of our proposal to radically reform the

exclusionary rule.
II. WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE RULE
The exclusionary rule is broken. The rule imposes unacceptably high systemic
costs and fails to provide meaningful deterrence of police misconduct.5 This
conclusion-our recognition of the stark reality that the rule stands in need of

repair-is not particularly controversial. Many, if not most, criminal law practitioners
and commentators agree that the rule is inefficient and ineffective.6 Undoubtedly,
the more difficult question is how to efficiently and effectively remedy police

violations of suspects' rights. Some believe that the exclusionary rule functions as
a core constitutional value.' The rule protects criminal defendants against abuses by

3. See id.
4. L. Timothy Perrin, H. Mitchell Caldwell, and Carol A. Chase with Ronald Fagan, If It's Broken,
Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 665 (1998). The proposed civil
administrative remedy is sometimes referred to herein as the "Pepperdine Proposal" solely for ease of
reference and does not imply that the proposal has been endorsed by Pepperdine University.
5. See infra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., William A. Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the
Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1981); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles,
107 HARv. L. REV. 757 (1994); Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SliP. CT.
REV. 49 (1982); James T. Ranney, The Exclusionary Rule-The Illusion vs. The Reality, 46 MoNT. L.
REV. 289 (1994).
7. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L REV. 349,
396-98, 411-14 (1974); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusionary Rule Rest on a
"'Principled
Basis" Rather Than an "Empirical Proposition?," 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565,574-75
(1983); SilasJ. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRiM.L. REV. 257,

294-98 (1984).
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the government, and thus, the high costs of the rule are simply part and parcel of our
constitutional framework.8 For others, the exclusionary rule is simply a pragmatic
choice-the best option among an array of unattractive alternatives. 9 We disagree
with both of those positions: the rule is not necessary to enforce the rights protected
by the Fourth or Fifth Amendments, and retaining the rule is not justified simply
because it's the best we can do.
The Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule with the dual purpose of
giving force to the Fourth Amendment and preserving judicial integrity. 0 Despite
these noble objections, the rule has proven to be both costly and ineffective. The
costs range from the obvious to the invidious. Chief among the obvious costs is the
loss of many otherwise viable criminal cases as a direct result of the suppression of
incriminating evidence. This cost expresses itself through public hostility toward a
criminal justice system that permits "the criminal to go free because the constable has
blundered."'" In addition, the exclusionary rule imposes certain costs on the system,
including the monetary cost of litigating motions to suppress evidence. A criminal
defendant has little, if anything, to lose by filing a motion to suppress evidence,
particularly in view of the huge windfall gained by a successful motion. Thus, the
rule creates an incentive for defendants to file even frivolous motions to suppress
evidence. Between eighty and ninety percent of all such motions are denied,' 2
indicating that many of them are interposed without appropriate legal or factual
support. Each suppression motion consumes many hours of attorney time, court
time, and witness time, all of which must be paid for with public funds or shared by
the public and the litigant.' 3
Furthermore, the exclusionary rule leads to an increase in perjury by police
officers attempting to avoid the effect of the exclusionary rule. 4 There is some
evidence of judicial acceptance of police perjury.' 5 In addition, the dramatic effect
of granting a motion to suppress, including dismissal of charges and the release of
8. See Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 396-98, 411-14; Kamisar, supra note 7, at 574-75;
Wasserstrom, supra note 7, at 294-98.
9. See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles,107 HARv. L. REV. 820, 841
(1994).
10. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,660 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94
(1914).
11. See Myron W. Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury and the Heater Factor: An ExclusionaryRule in
Chicago CriminalCourts, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 75,77 (1992) (quoting People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585,
587 (N.Y. 1926)).
12. See UNrrED STATES COMPTROLLER GENERAL, UNITED STATES ACCOUNTING OFFICEREPORT
TO CONGRESS, IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, 8, 10

(1979).
13. See Ranney, supra note 6, at 296; Schroeder, supra note 6, at 1383.
14. See Orfield, supra note 11, at 82-83.
15. See id.

obviously guilty defendants, has made courts reluctant to protect the constitutional
rights of defendants, construing conduct that logically appears to run afoul of the
Fourth Amendment as permissible. 16 In a judicial system that relies on precedent,
this reticence has caused a narrowing of the scope of protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment for all of us. 7 The cost of increased police perjury and
decreased protection of constitutional rights, while less obvious than other costs and
less susceptible to precise measurement, constitute two of the most critical costs
imposed by the rule.
Yet, even the high costs associated with the exclusionary rule might be
justifiable if the rule effectively deterred police conduct that violated the Fourth
Amendment. Several studies, including our own, have attempted to measure the
rule's effectiveness." The results show that the effectiveness of the rule is
inconclusive, at best, and some show that it is in fact a failure.'
Finally, a comparative legal analysis demonstrates that the United States stands
alone among common law countries in mandating the exclusion of relevant evidence
seized in violation of individual rights. England, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand all give courts discretion to exclude illegally seized evidence in certain

16. See H. Mitchell Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice
Blackmun's Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial UnderstandingAbout its Effects
Outside the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 45, 53-54 (1994).
17. See id.
18. See generally Perrin, et al., supra note 4, at 678; see, e.g., REPORT BY THE COMPTOLLER
GENERALOFTHE UNrrED STATES, GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFICE IMPACTOFTHE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
ON FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS (1979); NATIONAL INSTrUTE OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OFJUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A STUDY IN CALIFORNIA 2 (1982); JEROME H.

SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 33-35 (1966); Bradley C. Canon, Is the ExclusionaryRule in
FailingHealth? Some New Data and a Plea Against a PrecipitousConclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681
(1973); Bradley C. Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of Civil LibertiesPoliciesat the State andFederal
Levels, 5 AM. POL. Q. 57 (1977); Thomas Y. Davies, A HardLook at What We Know (andStill Need
to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost"
Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611,632; Effect ofMapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure
Practicesin Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 87 (1968); William C. Heffernan and
Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police
Compliancewith theLaw, 24 U, MICH. J.L. REFORM 311 (1991); James E. Spiotto, Search andSeizure:
An EmpiricalStudy of the ExclusionaryRule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973); Craig
D. Uchida and Timothy S. Bynum, Criminology: Search Warrants,Motions to Suppress and "Loss
Cases:" The Effects of the ExclusionaryRule in Seven Jurisdictions,81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1034, 1035 (1991); Michael Katz, The Supreme Court and the States: An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio
in North Carolina. The Model, the Study, and the Implications,45 N.C. L REV. 119 (1966); Stuart
S. Nagal, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 283, 283-84;
Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the ExclusionaryRule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 675
(1970); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence,Perjuryand the HeaterFactor:An ExclusionaryRule in
the Chicago CriminalCourts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 85-88 (1992) (hereinafter referred to as Orfield
11); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence:An EmpiricalStudy of Chicago
Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016 (1987) (hereinafter referred to as Orfield I).
19. See Perrin, et al., supra note 4, at 754-55.
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circumstances, 20 but none mandate exclusion." Indeed, it appears that the discretion
to exclude evidence is infrequently exercised and is limited to violations involving
only the most egregious of circumstances. 22
The combination of these considerations, the high costs associated with the
exclusionary rule, the paucity of evidence supporting its effectiveness, and the fact
that the United States is unique in mandating the exclusion of unlawfully seized
evidence, led us to undertake two projects. First, we conducted an empirical study
aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule in safeguarding Fourth
Amendment rights. 3 Second, we developed an alternative proposed remedy for
Fourth Amendment violations.24 The empirical study and our proposal are briefly
described below.
III. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE RULE

Recognizing that previous evaluations of the exclusionary rule only measured
the rule's deterrent effect indirectly, 5 we conducted a study of police officers
intended to directly measure their ability to apply the law of search and seizure and
to gauge their attitudes toward the exclusionary rule, including the extent to which
police perceive the rule as a deterrent.
Our 1997 questionnaire went to 1144 law enforcement officers in Ventura
County, California, including the Sheriff's Department and the five police
departments in the county.26 We received responses from 411 officers, roughly 36%
of those to whom the questionnaire was sent. Additionally, we sent the same
questionnaire to a group of 270 law enforcement officers from agencies throughout
California who recently attended a continuing education seminar involving search
and seizure law.' From this group fifty-five responded, roughly 20%.29 We also
administered the hypothetical questions contained in the questionnaire to eighty first
year law students, who had just completed a three unit course in criminal procedure. 3°

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See Caldwell & Chase, supra note 16, at 57-66.
See id.
See id.
See Perrin, et al., supra note 4, at 711-36.
See id. at 743-53.
See id. at71l.
See id. at 712-13.
See id. at713.
See id.

29. See id.
30. See id.

A. Participants'Backgrounds
The questionnaire sought biographical information including rank, experience,
and education, and tested the officers understanding of the law, of search and
seizure, and police interrogation. 3 The background of those participating in the
study was diverse, although almost all of the respondents had taken some college
courses. 2 This college educated group was almost equally divided among those who
had obtained an associate's degree, a two year program, and those who obtained a
bachelor's degree. 3 Close to half held the rank of officer, about one-fifth held the
rank of detective, and the remainder, about one-third, held a rank above detective.34
The responding officers were "relatively evenly divided according to years of
experience."35
B. The Responses
Our study addressed four aspects of the exclusionary rule: (1) the cognitive
component of deterrence; (2) the specific deterrence of offending officers; (3) the
costs of the rule; and (4) alternatives to the rle2 6
1. Cognitive component of deterrence
The cognitive component of deterrence was studied by testing the police
officer's ability to apply the law in hypothetical factual settings. 37 We reasoned that
"police can only be deterred from conducting illegal searches or violating a suspect's
Miranda rights if the officers know what the law does and does not permit. 3 The
questionnaire contained five hypothetical questions involving search and seizure
issues and five involving police interrogation issues.39 We hoped to determine the
strength of the correlation between the extent and effectiveness of training and the
officers' ability to understand and apply the rules, 4° assuming that better trained
officers would better understand the limits on their conduct under the Fourth
Amendment and the consequences of exceeding those limits. We also sought to
learn whether each officer understood the purpose of excluding improper evidence
and whether the officers regularly considered the exclusionary rule in their

31. See id. at 713-14, app. at 756-65.
32. See id. at 719.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 720.
36. See id. at714.
37. See id. at 714, app. at 763-64.
38. Seeid. at714-15.
39. See id. at 714.
40. See id. at 735 (noting that the results of the question "support the... conclusion that training
and education contribute to a better understanding of the law"),
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investigative work."'
The officers at the Sheriff's Department answered questions concerning search
and seizure law correctly 64.2% of the time, the Ventura County police officers
answered 64.5% correctly, the law enforcement officials who had recently attended
a training course answered 64.6% correctly, and the first year law students answered
70% correctly.42
The officers' performance on the search and seizure questions was largely
unaffected by rank, experience, or the extent of their pre-commission education.4
However, the extent of police education and training of the officer received
positively affected performance and understanding.' In their preparatory training
at a police academy, both the police department and sheriff's department respondents
had received an average of about twenty three hours of education in search and
seizure matters and fewer than ten hours in police interrogation matters.' The extent
of an officer's academy training bore a positive and statistically significant
relationship to the officer's understanding of the hypotheticals: the more hours of
academy training in search and seizure reported by the officer, the better the officer
performed on the hypotheticals."
All but twelve of the respondents had received some form of continuing
education and training. The officers who were part of the group that had recently
attended a continuing education seminar performed better than any other group in
answering the search and seizure hypotheticals.' Among the officers as a whole,
those who had received some form of continuing training answered 52.6% of the
hypotheticals correctly, while those without any such training answered 35%
correctly. In the police interrogation context, there was no apparent relationship
between continuing education and understanding of the hypotheticals. s0
2.

The specific deterrence of offending officers

Our survey addressed the rule's effect as a general or specific deterrent, seeking
to determine whether the exclusionary rule deters individual officers from violating

41.

See id. at 734.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See id. at 728.
See id. at 730.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 731.

47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
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the Fourth Amendment."
"The rule is a general deterrent to the extent that it
discourages a class of individuals from prohibited conduct," specifically if the
specter of excluding evidence discourages officers from violating the rules. 2 The
rule is a specific deterrent if individual officers found to have violated the rules are
especially diligent in their compliance in the future. 53 Some previous research has
shown the rule to be a weak specific deterrent, probably because of insufficient
feedback, a lack of internal discipline of offenders, or even a lack of education.54 We
asked the officers if they had testified in court on a motion to suppress and if so, the
manner in which they learned about the court's ruling, if at all.55 From these
inquiries we hoped to learn the extent to which those who had suffered the
suppression of evidence in the past viewed the rule as a deterrent, as well as the
extent to which their competence in applying the rules compared to officers who had
never had evidence excluded.
In probing the extent of general deterrence, most officers said they considered
the potential exclusion of evidence to be an importantconcern, but not the primary
concern in their investigative work.56 About 20% indicated it was a primary concern,
while nearly 60% considered suppression to be an important concern.57 The
responses were similar with regard to police interrogation. Significantly, over 18%
felt the threat of suppression was only a minor concern or of no concern in the search
and seizure context.5" Furthermore, almost 30% similarly minimized the threat of
suppression in the context of police interrogations.59
The overwhelming majority of respondents said they had testified at a
suppression hearing. 6° The average number of appearances for search and seizure
motions ranged from 15.4 per officer for the sheriff's department to 18.3 for the
police departments. 6' While 40% of the officers responded that evidence seized by
them had been suppressed, half of those officers admitted to only a single instance
of exclusion. 62 Interestingly, in response to subsequent questions asking whether any
evidence they had gathered had been excluded, 55% admitted to prior exclusion,

51. See id. at 713-17 (describing the survey's method for gauging the rule's deterrent effect).
52. See id. at 716 (citing Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV.
937, 987-89 (1985)).
53. See Perrin, et al., supra note 4, at 716.
54. See Spiotto, supranote 18, at 276-77. Spiotto found in a study of the Chicago Narcotics Court
in June 1971 that 276 defendants made motions to suppress in 172 different cases, involving alleged

misconduct by 130 sworn officers. See id. Nine of the officers were responsible for 25 cases involving
34 defendants and within one month these officers repeated the same search practice that had just been
held unlawful by the court. See id.
55. See Perrin, et al., supra note 4, app. at 758-59.
56. See id. at 720.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 720-21.
59. See id. at 720.
60. See id. at 722.
61. See id.
62. See id.
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creating an apparent 15% discrepancy in the data.63
Two-thirds of the officers who had testified in a suppression hearing reported
that they heard the judge's ruling in court when it was rendered.6 Ten percent
reported hearing about the ruling from another officer. 65 Fewer than 30% learned of
the ruling through formal communication with the prosecutor or their supervisor.6
These findings suggest that the exclusionary rule fails to specifically deter police
misconduct.
The rule's failure as a specific deterrent is demonstrated in two ways: (1) the apparent
absence of any formal procedure ... for notifying officers when they have had
evidence subsequently excluded by the court; and (2) the failure of the officers who
had previously had evidence excluded to outperform other officers on the hypothetical
questions. The exclusion of evidence, if it is to provide any specific deterrence, must
be a learning experience for the officer. 7
Similarly, the rule is not a significant general deterrent, as is recognized by the
officers themselves.
One in five officers minimized the importance of the
exclusionary rule as a deterrent in the field.0 Moreover, the study confims that a
large percentage of law enforcement officers do not understand the law well enough
to be deterred by exclusion, particularly when conducting searches and seizures.
"The study's results support the obvious conclusion that ' [continuing] training and
education contribute to a better understanding of the law. "
3.

The costs of the exclusionary rule

We also gathered information about the societal costs of the exclusionary rule,
including the extent to which the police lie to avoid the suppression of evidence.70
As we explained at some length in our article, we encountered strong resistance to
questions about police perjury from officers in the departments we surveyed.7 ' In the
end, we asked the officers broadly worded questions about their awareness of
misrepresentations by fellow officers either while testifying in court or in police
reports.7

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id.
See id. at 723.
See id.
See id. at 723-24.
Id. at 734.
See id. at 735.
Id.

70.

See id. at 717-18

71.
72.

See id.
See id. app. at 758-59.
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On the question of police deception, more than 80% stated that they had never
heard of a police officer attempting to avoid suppression by misrepresenting or
failing to fully disclose the facts while giving in-court testimony or in preparing
police reports.7" This result is not surprising because this type of deception is, itself,
a violation of law. Of those who admitted the existence of deception, they minimized
its extent by admitting knowledge of only one or two instances. 4 A few officers
acknowledged much more pervasive problems, claiming to have heard of deception
and perjury as many as ten, twenty or even fifty times.75 It is noteworthy that the
officers reporting the lowest average number of instances of deception were those
with less than one year of experience and the officers with the highest average were
among the most experienced officers.76
[Tihese statistics may mean nothing more than that the longer one works in law
enforcement, the more likely one is to witness instances of police officer dishonesty.
On the other hand, they may mean that those individuals with greater seniority and
better perspective are more willing to admit that dishonesty by police happens with
some regularity."
Finally, the responses are consistent with the widely held belief that the
exclusionary rule imposes a substantial cost on society in the form of police officer
deception.78 A number of the respondents described a problem of alarming
proportions.79 Moreover, the responses depict not just occasional ethical lapses on
the witness stand, but even more frequent misrepresentations by police in the
completion of their reports.80 When one factors in the natural reluctance of police
officers to admit the existence of such conduct, which likely caused it to be underreported, the problem of police deception becomes significant.
The study also reveals that the unnecessarily complicated law of search and
seizure is a substantial hidden cost of the exclusionary rule. The officers were
substantially more likely to respond correctly to the interrogation hypotheticals than
to the search and seizure hypotheticals.8 ' "Yet, they considered the specter of
suppression less prominently in the interrogation context than when conducting
searches and suffered fewer exclusions under Miranda than under Fourth Amendment law." 2 The relative simplicity of the Miranda rules, including the reliance on
a bright line test for compliance, appears to achieve a better and healthier balance
than the ad hoc patchwork approach of search and seizure law.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
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See id. at 725.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 726.
See id. at 735.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 728.
Id. at 735.
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4. Police officer attitudes
Finally, the questionnaire sought to elicit police officers' attitudes about
potential alternatives to the exclusionary rule, as well as alternatives to the current

Mirandaand search and seizure rules. The survey offered seven alternatives to the
exclusionary rule, including retention of the exclusionary rule, criminal prosecution
of the offending officer, internal discipline including termination of employment,
internal discipline not including termination, payment of monetary damages by the
officer after a civil lawsuit, or, alternatively, after an administrative proceeding, and
requiring the officer to participate in educational courses.8 3 The officers were
instructed to circle each choice they believed would effectively deter unlawful
searches, seizures, and interrogations. 4 We also asked the officers how they felt
about the underlying rules of search and seizure and police interrogation, and gave
them a range of options for each. 5
A strong majority of the respondents, 57%, said that "'Itihe interests of the
criminal justice system are well served by excluding unlawfully seized evidence,' and
that none of the alternative remedies (not even education for the offending officer)
was necessary. Not surprisingly, the most popular suggested alternative remedy was
a requirement that officers attend educational courses on search and seizure or police
interrogation with more than one-third of the respondents choosing that option. ' "
The other options, which each involved significant adverse consequences to the
offending police officer, were markedly less popular.87 In fact, their mere inclusion
offended some of the officers.88 About 20% were willing to entertain the possibility
of implementing internal police discipline as a consequence of misconduct.8 9
In response to our questions, 40% of the officers stated they believed that the
law was reasonably clear and not difficult to apply,' and another 40% stated a
preference for bright-line rules, eliminating the need for a search warrant as long as
there is probable cause. 9' The remaining 20% of the officers believed that the law
was too uncertain to be easily applied in the field.' Thus, about 60% of the

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id. app. at 761.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

90. See id.
91.

See id.

92. See id.
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officers-a clear majority-shared a concern about the clarity of the current law by
voicing
displeasure with its complexity and supporting a substantial change in the
law. 93
By contrast, a majority of officers believe that the law surrounding police
interrogation is clear and not difficult to apply. 94 Fifty-three percent of the
participants approved the existing rule, 95 while 40% would prefer a rule requiring
only that the statement of the accused be voluntary rather than mandating a reading
of the Miranda rights. 96 Furthermore, only 7% believed that the law of police
interrogation was unduly complicated or uncertain.97
5. Conclusion
Our study confirms what previous studies revealed: the exclusionary rule does
not effectively deter police misconduct. Indeed, it has fostered misconduct in the
form of police deception. This troubling conclusion, coupled with the exceedingly
high costs of the rule, mandate a search for a workable solution.
IV. REFORM OF THE RULE

The significant challenge in reforming the exclusionary rule is finding a
mechanism that deters police misconduct and enforces the rights of the aggrieved
fairly and equitably without crippling the ability of law enforcement officers to do
their jobs. We believe that the rule can be fixed without disrupting the delicate
balance between the rights of the defendant and the needs of the criminal justice
system, and that our proposed repair of the rule will cause the rule to better serve the
purposes for which it was originally adopted. We have proposed a two part
modification of the exclusionary rule that would partially retain the rule by limiting
its application only to the most egregious police violations.9" Additionally, it would
provide victims of police misconduct an efficient and equitable administrative
remedy.

The first prong of our proposal limits application of the exclusionary rule to
instances of intentional or willful police violation of a person's rights.9 When law
enforcement officials purposefully obtain evidence illegally, the exclusionary rule is
needed to preserve judicial integrity. The court loses its judicial authority if forced
to admit evidence that the police obtained without regard for another's constitutional

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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See id.
See id. at 734.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 673.
See id. at 743.
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rights. 00 On the other hand, evidence that was illegally obtained by police as the
result of unintentional actions,'"' whether characterized as *reckless, negligent, or
innocent conduct, would not be excluded. Instead, an administrative process would
be available to the injured party to provide compensation for the violation of his
constitutional rights.'02
The civil administrative remedy we propose would 'be based on an existing
administrative remedy currently used in California to redress discriminatory housing
or employment practices."3 The administrative process that we envision would be
controlled by an agency completely independent from other law enforcement
agencies, but within the executive branch of government. The agency would be
bifurcated into an enforcement arm and an adjudicative arm."° Victims of police
misconduct would initiate the administrative process by filing a written complaint
with the enforcement arm of the agency.'03 The claim would have to be filed within
one year of the violation, although the limitations period would be tolled during the
pendency of any criminal proceeding.'t 6 The agency would conduct a preliminary
review of the complaint to determine whether the allegations, on their face and based
on preliminary investigation, sufficed to constitute a prima facie violation of the
victim's constitutional rights."° If the complaint proved baseless, the agency would
dismiss the claim subject to the complainant's right to pursue a tort remedy."0
If the complaint survived the initial review, the administrative agency would file
a formal complaint on behalf of the victim and would serve as the victim's advocate
during the administrative process." 9 The wiitten complaint would be served on the

100. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 214 (1960); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31
(1949) (overruled by Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961)); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392
(1914); see also Kamisar, supra note 7, at 604 (discussing Olmstead v. United States, 297 U.S. 438

(1928).
101. See Perrin, et al., supra note 4, at 753 (discussing the standard for intentional or willful police
misconduct and concluding that the standard should be similar to the common law distinction between
murder and manslaughter).
102. See id.
103. See CA. GOv'T CODE § 12900 et seq. (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (outlining the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act).
104. See id. §§ 12935 (describing the Fair Employment and Housing Commission, which serves an
adjudicative function) and 12930 (describing the Department ofFair Employment and Housing, which

serves the enforcement function).
105. See id. § 12960 (West 1992).
106. See id. ("No complaint may be filed after the expiration of one year from ... the alleged
unlawful practice.").
107. See id. § 12963.
108. See id. § 12965(b) (West Supp. 1999) (requiring the Department of Fair Employment and
Housing to notify the complainant of available judicial options in a"right-to-sue" letter within 150 days
if no administrative proceeding in initiated by the Department).
109. See id. §§ 12965(a) & 12969 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999).

accused officers and agencies and provide them with an opportunity to respond in
writing. The administrative process would follow the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act"' to ensure efficient prehearing procedures."' A limited
discovery process would allow for the disclosure of known witnesses and the
exchange of pertinent documents and exhibits. Depositions would be allowed for
material witnesses and for anyone unable to attend the hearing."'
An evidentiary hearing would then be held, presided over by an administrative
judge who would make findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the evidence
presented."' The administrative judge's decision would then be submitted to the
adjudicative arm of the administrative agency for review. "4 In its oversight function,
the agency's commissioners would either adopt, modify, or reject the judge's
decision."' The decision,
once final, would be judicially enforceable and subject to
6
appellate review."
The claimant would bear the burden of proof at the hearing and would have to
prove that the officer violated his or her rights by acting contrary to established legal

principles. The officer's conduct would be measured for its reasonableness."i Thus,
an officer who acted in an objectively reasonable manner would bear no liability.
The objective reasonableness standard would eliminate the empty head/white heart
defense for officers."' Poorly trained or deliberately ignorant officers would be
liable for their actions, based on the premise that ignorance is never reasonable. This
standard would force officers to obtain the training and education necessary to do
their jobs competently and to gain the legal protection of an affirnative defense
against misconduct claims." 9 The liability of police departments and other law
enforcement agencies would be limited to claims based on the agencies' customs or
policies, rather than traditional vicariousliability, consistent with the approach taken

110. See id. § l1500etseq. (West 1992&Supp. 1997).
111. See Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, 814 P.2d 704,715 (Cal.
1991) (administrative procedure under FEHA is "streamlined and economical").
112.. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11507.6 (West Supp. 1999) (requiring exchange of witness lists and
pertinent documents within 30 days of initial pleading); see id. at § 11511 (allowing depositions of
material and unavailable witnesses upon the filing of a verified petition by either side).
113. See id. §§ 11513, and 11517(b) (discussing respectively the rules for evidentiary hearings and
decisions by administrative law judge).
114. Seeid. § 11517(b).
115. See id.
116. See id. §§ 12973(b), 11523 (discussing respectively, the enforcement of administrative
decisions and judicial review of administrative decisions).
117. See Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 858 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that the issue of police
immunity is one of reasonableness).
118. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,818 (1982) (holding that police immunity is available
only if officers "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known").
119. Cf Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635,640 (1980) (concluding that qualified immunity claim by
officers is an affirmative defense).
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0
under current law.12

The claimant would be entitled to recover economic and noneconomic damages
subject to traditional requirements of proof. In addition, however, the administrative
system would allow the claimant to recover statutory liquidated damages for each
violation committed by the police officer or agency.' 21 This statutorily mandated
monetary recovery for injured victims would provide an incentive for victims to file
claims in the administrative office even in situations where actual damage would be
difficult to prove, and, at the same time, would create a strong deterrent for police
misconduct. This part of the proposal is essential to make the administrative process
viable, both because of the frequent difficulty encountered by victims of police
misconduct in trying to prove damages 22 and because of the need to recognize the
value our system places on constitutionally protected rights. In addition, victims of
intentional or willful police misconduct could recover punitive damages from the
officers or their employer.'23
The proposed administrative process has five significant advantages over the
current exclusionary rule. First, the civil administrative remedy would deter police
misconduct more effectively than the exclusionary rule by holding officers and law
enforcement agencies directly accountable for their misconduct, rather than
punishing the system for police errors by handicapping the jury in its search for the
truth and prosecutors in their efforts to prove wrongdoing.124 Second, the administrative process would provide all victims of police misconduct with a strong incentive
to raise such claims, as opposed to the exclusionary rule which only confers standing
on those who are actually prosecuted for a crime. 2 5 Third, the administrative process
would provide a fair, equitable, and efficient process for victims, helping to avoid
the pro-law enforcement bias that victims often face with juries, and reducing the
high cost and delay endemic to civil judicial remedies.'26 Fourth, the administrative
process would provide a proportional remedy to victims, unlike the exclusionary rule
which gives the greatest windfall to the person guilty of the most heinous crime,
rather than to the person subjected to the most serious constitutional violation. 27
Fifth, implementation of the administrative process would increase public confidence

120. See Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,403 (1997) (reaffirming that
the Supreme Court has "consistently refused to hold municipalities liable under a theory of respondeat
superior").
121. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12987 (West Supp. 1999).
122. See, e.g., Casey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978) (holding that plaintiffs may not recover
"personal damages" for due process violation in absence of proof of actual injury).
123. See Amar, supra note 6, at 759, 797-99; Posner, supranote 6, at 53-54.
124. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12987(a)(3) (West Supp. 1999).
125. See Perrin, et al., supra note 4, at 744-45.
126. See id. at 751-53.
127. See id. at 752.

in the criminal justice system, reducing the number of defendants dismissed based
on technicalities and helping to reverse the continuing erosion of the constitutional
rights of all persons.'
The primary concern about our proposed administrative remedy is the cost and
feasibility of creating a new agency to process claims of police misconduct.
Undoubtedly, the process we envision would not come cheap, and we do not offer
it without serious consideration of that fact. Yet, the current approach is costly too,
both in terms of the amount of time courts and lawyers must take dealing with
unsupported and wasteful motions to suppress and in terms of the erosion of rights
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Some of the unacceptably high cost of the
current system can be measured only by the incremental loss of freedom for every
citizen, not in dollars and cents. Our proposal, though costly in some ways, would
help reverse that pattern.
We believe our proposed administrative remedy addresses the concerns that led
to the implementation of the exclusionary rule: specifically, the protection of
constitutional rights by deterring police misconduct. It also serves the criminal
justice system because it holds criminal defendants accountable for their criminal
activity.
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See id. at 753.

